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This study examines bymeans of functional magnetic resonance imaging the neural mecha-
nisms underlying adolescents’ risk decision-making in social contexts.We hypothesize that
the social context could engage brain regions associated with social cognition processes
and developmental changes are also expected. Sixty participants (adolescents: 17–18, and
young adults: 21–22 years old) read narratives describing typical situations of decision-
making in the presence of peers. They were asked to make choices in risky situations
(e.g., taking or refusing a drug) or ambiguous situations (e.g., eating a hamburger or a
hotdog). Risky as compared to ambiguous scenarios activated bilateral temporoparietal
junction (TPJ), bilateral middle temporal gyrus (MTG), rightmedial prefrontal cortex, and the
precuneus bilaterally; i.e., brain regions related to social cognition processes, such as self-
reﬂection and theory of mind (ToM). In addition, brain structures related to cognitive control
were active [right anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC), bilateral orbitofrontal cortex], whereas no signiﬁcant clusters were obtained in
the reward system (ventral striatum). Choosing the dangerous option involved a further
activation of control areas (ACC) and emotional and social cognition areas (temporal pole).
Adolescents employed more neural resources than young adults in the right DLPFC
and the right TPJ in risk situations. When choosing the dangerous option, young adults
showed a further engagement in ToM related regions (bilateral MTG) and in motor control
regions related to the planning of actions (pre-supplementary motor area). Finally, the
right insula and the right superior temporal gyrus were more activated in women than
in men, suggesting more emotional involvement and more intensive modeling of the
others’ perspective in the risky conditions. These ﬁndings call for more comprehensive
developmental accounts of decision-making in social contexts that incorporate the role of
emotional and social cognition processes.
Keywords: adolescent risk and ambiguous decision-making, dangerous and safe choices, fMRI, decision-making in
social context, emotional and social cognitive processing, age and gender differences
INTRODUCTION
Adolescence is a developmental period characterized by decisions
and actions that give rise to an increased incidence of uninten-
tional injuries and violence, alcohol and drug abuse, unintended
pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases. Results from the
Youth Risk Behavior Survey (2011) indicate that many high school
students are engaged in health-risk behaviors associated with
the leading causes of death among persons aged 10–24 years in
the United States. Many studies have shown that risky behav-
iors are more frequent during adolescence and early adult years
than in adults over 25 and are major contributors to physi-
cal and psychological problems (Steinberg, 2004, 2008; Eaton
et al., 2008). Of special concern is the adolescents’ increasing
reliance on risk-taking behavior in decision-making situations,
especially in the presence of peers as compared to adults (Gard-
ner and Steinberg, 2005). The goal of this study is to examine,
by means of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), neu-
ral responses to risk and ambiguous decision-making in social
scenarios involving the presence of peers in adolescents and young
adults.
RISK AND AMBIGUOUS DECISION-MAKING
In the literature of decision-making there is a common distinc-
tion between decisions under ambiguity and decisions under risk
(e.g., Bechara et al., 2005). In ambiguous decisions, the probabil-
ity of a speciﬁc outcome is either unknown or close to chance
and the two choices do not differ in reward value nor in the
likelihood of negative consequences. For example, in the two-
choice prediction task, the participant chooses on which side of
a house a car will appear. The probability of the car appearing
on the left side of the house is identical to it appearing on the
right side and there is no risk associated with choosing one side
or the other. In decisions involving risk, the possible outcomes are
also uncertain, but participants are asked to decide between a safe
choice and a dangerous choice, given the likelihood of a given out-
come. For example, in gambling tasks safe choices may have a high
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probability of gaining a reward, but the reward is relatively low in
value. In contrast, dangerous choices may have a low probability
of gaining a reward, though the reward is substantially larger in
value.
Neuroimaging studies have examined whether the neural sub-
strates of decision-making may differ depending on the nature of
the decision required. A meta-analysis of fMRI studies with gam-
bling tasks in adults (e.g., the Iowa Gambling Task, the Cambridge
Risk Task) reported that ambiguous decision-making was associ-
ated with activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC),
dorsal and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and the parietal lobe,
whereas risky decision-making was associated with activity in the
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and the rostral portions of the ACC
(Krain et al., 2006). However, some fMRI studies suggest that the
role of the right DLPFC may be particularly critical for the reg-
ulation of risk-taking behavior (Ernst et al., 2002; Fishbein et al.,
2005). This was conﬁrmed by a transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) study in which the transient disruption of the function of
the rightDLPFC,but not of the left DLPFC, increased participants’
riskier decision-making in a gambling task (Knoch et al., 2006).
Other studies found that ambiguity, relative to risk, increased the
blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signal in the OFC and
the amygdala, possibly since both are involved in detecting rel-
evant stimuli of uncertain value (Elliott et al., 2000; Hsu et al.,
2005; Levy et al., 2010). In sum, the speciﬁc role of the DLPFC
and the OFC in risk and ambiguous decision-making is still
controversial.
RISK DECISION-MAKING IN SOCIAL CONTEXTS
Most of the studies using the fMRI technique have investigated
the neural correlates of risk decision-making by using gambles or
bets as decision tasks in a social vacuum (Sanfey, 2007). A few
studies have investigated the neural correlates of risky decision-
making when participants are confronted with a social scenario
in which the presence of others may modulate their decisions.
Such scenarios may require mentalizing or theory of mind (ToM)
abilities to explain and predict others’ behaviors by attributing
independent mental states to them, such as thoughts, beliefs, and
desires (Frith and Frith, 2003). Some studies using competitive
and cooperative social decision-making tasks (e.g., the Ultimate
Game; Güth et al., 1982), which require inferences about the other
players’ mental states suggest so. For instance, a number of fMRI
studies in adults involving social tasks have shown activity in
the brain’s reward system (e.g. nucleus accumbens) consistent
with the desire to win monetary rewards and in the emotional
system (e.g., insula and OFC) related to the unfairness of the
offer. Interestingly, social decision-making tasks have also pro-
duced activations in ToM related regions [e.g., superior temporal
sulcus (STS), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and medial pre-
frontal cortex (mPFC)], consistent with the processing of one’s
own and the other player’s actions and intentions (Montague,
2007; Burnett et al., 2011; Rilling and Sanfey, 2011). Activations
in the mPFC, ACC, and TPJ have also been obtained during false-
belief tasks, a classical task targeting ToM processing (e.g., Saxe
and Kanwisher, 2003; Amodio and Frith, 2006; Saxe and Powell,
2006; Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009; Young et al., 2010; Mar,
2011).
ADOLESCENT RISK DECISION-MAKING
In recent years, a dual-system model on adolescent risk-taking
derived from developmental neuroscience has suggested that the
adolescents’ greater vulnerability to risky behavior is due to the
temporal gap between the full maturation of two brain systems
(Steinberg, 2008, 2010; Ernst et al., 2009; Somerville et al., 2010;
Casey et al., 2011). The ﬁrst system, which has been called the
“socioemotional” incentive processing system is localized mainly
in the ventral striatum (VS) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(VMPFC) and includes also the amygdala and the OFC. This
system is particularly important for valuation and prediction of
potential rewards and punishments in decision-making and is
operative in early adolescence. The second system, referred to
as the “cognitive control” system is localized mainly in dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), the parietal cortex, and the
ACC. This system subserves executive functions such as response
inhibition (Luna et al., 2010), impulse regulation (Steinberg et al.,
2008), and ﬂexible rule use (Crone et al., 2006). It supports
goal-directed decision-making and matures gradually over the
course of adolescence and young adulthood. Accordingly, devel-
opmental evidence in a gambling task shows that activation in
dorsal ACC showed a linear decrease with age from 8- to 10-
year-old participants to adult participants associated with risky
choices, probably as a reﬂection of the need to engage more
brain activity in these areas in less mature stages of devel-
opment. In turn, activation in VMPFC and VS showed an
inverted U-shaped developmental pattern, with a peak in ado-
lescence compared to children and adults (Van Leijenhorst et al.,
2010).
However, recent reviews suggest that the evidence obtained in
support of the dual model may not generalize to all contexts or
tasks (Crone andDahl, 2012; Pfeifer andAllen,2012). For example,
Chein et al. (2011) examined the impact of the presence of peers on
risk decision-making in a driving game (Gardner and Steinberg,
2005). The presence of familiar peers heightened responses in VS
and OFC during risk choices more for adolescents than adults, in
line with the dual model. Brain areas associated with cognitive
control (DLPFC) were less strongly recruited by adolescents than
adults, and brain activity in this area did not vary with the peer
manipulation. However, a different pattern of results emerged in a
second study done by Peake et al. (2013) using the same task. Ado-
lescents’ safe choices in the driving game, after an episode of social
exclusion from hypothetical peers, were associated with greater
activation in right DLPFC and OFC, but also with other regions
implicated in ToM abilities such as the posterior cingulate cortex
and precuneus (PCC/prec), mPFC, and bilateral TPJ. Therefore,
some other regions of interest (ROIs) appeared to be engaged
in the same decision task when involving the social exclusion of
virtual peers.
CURRENT STUDY
The present study was designed to provide further evidence on
the adolescents’ neural responses to risk decision-making in social
contexts following two new directions: First, decision-making was
tested in the context of realistic everyday situations. We created
a novel Social Context Decision task (SCDT) that consisted of
short stories that describe social situations involving risk and
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ambiguous decision-making. The stories mentioned everyday sit-
uations in which participants accompanied by a close peer are
either involved in risk situationswhere they have to decide between
a dangerous or a safe choice (e.g., taking or refusing a drug), or
in ambiguous situations where they have to select between two
neutral choices (e.g., drinking coke or orange juice). Thus, we
manipulated the type of decisions to be made (ambiguous or risk
decision-making), with the social context held constant (peers
are mentioned in the scenario in both cases). This manipula-
tion may help to reveal the neural response speciﬁcally associated
to risk decision-making in social contexts since both conditions
involved decisions. Such speciﬁcity in the neural responses would
be related to the different nature of the decision task. Partici-
pants in risk situations have to decide between dangerous and
safe options having knowledge of what the probability of the out-
come might be, whereas participants in ambiguous situations do
not know the possible outcomes associated with neutral choices.
Further comparison between dangerous and safe choices in risk
situations can also be informative of the decision-making process
in the SCDT.
The second direction taken in this study was to test develop-
mental effects in the pattern of brain activation under risk and
ambiguous conditions in our SCDT. Young men and women from
two age groups (late adolescents: 17–18 years old, and young
adults: 21–22 years old) participated in the fMRI study. These
ages were selected for two reasons. First, the dual model postu-
lates an imbalance between the maturation of control and reward
brain circuitry during adolescence that becomes less pronounced
in early adulthood years (e.g., Steinberg, 2010). Therefore, it would
be relevant to examine whether there are differences in brain acti-
vation in such critical transition. Second, age comparisons can also
reveal the existence of developmental changes in social decision-
making in SCDT, taking into account that the emotional and
social cognition processes presumably involved also showed late
developments (Blakemore and Robbins, 2012; Crone and Dahl,
2012).
Based on prior empirical studies, we ﬁrst predicted that our
risk and ambiguous conditions in the SCDT would activate at least
part of the brain circuitry that is activated for risk and ambigu-
ous decision-making with gambling tasks (e.g., DLPFC, OFC,
and ACC). More speciﬁcally, we predicted that the brain control-
related regions would be more activated while making choices in
the risk situations, as more engagement of executive functions
may be required, than in the ambiguous situations. According to
the dual-system model, risk decision-making involves response
inhibition, impulse regulation and response conﬂict (Steinberg
et al., 2008). We also predicted heightened responses in the
reward-related neural regions (e.g., VS) during dangerous choices
compared to safe choices, following the dual-system model (Chein
et al., 2011).
Of particular interest in this study is the potential activation
of other brain systems related to social cognition processes. Our
SCDT presents stories in which close peers are mentioned in the
decision-making scenario. We propose that decision-making in
social scenarios would presumably require participants to engage
both in a self-reﬂective process in which a decision is made
regarding oneself, and a perspective-taking process in which the
peers’mental state with regard to the decision is considered. Based
on this proposal we predicted the activation of regions in two
overlapping brain systems: the so-called self-reﬂection network
involving the mPFC, PCC/Precuneus and ACC (van der Meer
et al., 2010) and the ToM network involving the mPFC, TPJ, and
STS among other regions (e.g., Frith and Frith, 2003; Saxe and
Kanwisher, 2003; Young et al., 2010). We predicted that the SCDT
would activate regions in both systems more while making choices
in the risk situations than in the ambiguous situations. Social
decision-making in risk situations entails a complex evaluation
process since participants have to model their decisions not only
according to their own point of view but also taking into account
how their decisions will impact the others’ point of view about
them (for example, being admired, accepted or rejected by peers
according to the dangerous or safe choices). By contrast, the lack
of clear expectancies related to their neutral choices, especially
those referring to their potential impact to the peers’ point of
view, would make the self-reﬂection process a less complex one,
as there would be less need to take into account the peers’ point
of view.
A further goal of this study was to test the existence of age and
gender differences in the pattern of brain activation under risk and
ambiguous conditions in our SCDT.Age-relatedpredictions are no
more than tentative, given the practical absence of developmental
studies using risk decision-making in social context tasks. How-
ever, we expected developmental effects in control-related regions
and reward-related regions based on previous studies. Speciﬁcally
we expected higher activations in the control- and reward-related
regions in adolescents than in young adults, suggesting that more
brain activity in functional regions is associated with less mature
stages of development. As for the developmental effects in other
brain regions related to social cognition, a recent meta-analysis
of studies using social reasoning paradigms and self-knowledge
paradigms has shown that the mPFC is often more activated in
adolescents (ages 9–18 years) compared to adults, whereas the
TPJ is often less activated in adolescents (ages 10–17 years) com-
pared to adults (Crone and Dahl, 2012). Other studies have also
found that adolescents exhibit enhanced reactivity in mPFC dur-
ing ToM tasks, relative to adults (Blakemore, 2008, 2011; Burnett
et al., 2008; Pfeifer et al., 2009; van den Bos et al., 2011; Blake-
more and Robbins, 2012; Moor et al., 2012; Pfeifer and Blakemore,
2012). However, there is an open debate about the direction of the
age effects and their interpretation, since some studies have found
more activation in adolescence than in young adulthood and oth-
ers just the reverse pattern (Crone and Dahl, 2012; Pfeifer and
Allen, 2012). Therefore, the present results may provide further
evidence on that issue.
Popular gender stereotypes hold thatwomen aremore sensitive,
more emotional, better mind readers, and – most importantly –
less prone to risky behavior than men. However, laboratory
decision-making tasks do not consistently conﬁrm the latter claim.
Men and women behave similarly in gambling risk-taking tasks
(Gardner and Steinberg, 2005; Galvan et al., 2007; Van Leijenhorst
et al., 2010). None of the neurological studies in social decision-
makinghave investigated gender effects. Therefore, in this studywe
exploredwhether there are differences inneural activationbetween
gender groups in the SCDT.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Sixty healthy participants with no history of psychiatric illness
were included in the study. We recruited participants from two age
groups: thirty late adolescents (aged 17–18 years; 15 female and
15 male; mean age 17.50, SD = 0.51) from public high schools
and 30 young adults (aged 21–22; 15 female and 15 male; mean
age 21.40, SD = 0.49) from university and technical schools. All
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were
right-handed according to the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory
(Oldﬁeld, 1971). Data for 31 additional participants were excluded
for the following reasons: fourteen for excessive head movement
(>1 mm), one for asymptomatic brain abnormality found in MR
scan, six for incomplete experimental session, ﬁve for technical
problems, and ﬁve for getting outlier scores in the screening tests
(see below). All participants, or a primary caregiver in the case of
minors, gave informed consent. All the procedures were approved
by the Committee for Research Ethics and Animal Welfare at the
University of La Laguna.
All participants were within the normal range of cognitive and
verbal abilities within the cut-off values of ±2 SD in the following
screening tests: (a) the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test of executive
functioning: M = 100.9; SD = 6.4 (Berg, 1948; Grant and Berg,
1948); (b) theWorkingMemory-SentencesTest: M = 2.2; SD= 0.7
(Siegel and Ryan, 1989); and (c) the Controlled Oral Word Asso-
ciation Test (Phonemic Fluency: M = 37.1; SD = 8.8, Semantic
Fluency: M = 24.6; SD = 4.9, and General Fluency M = 30.8;
SD = 5.9, Benton et al., 1994). There were no differences due to
age and gender in any of the tests.
THE SOCIAL CONTEXT DECISION TASK
The study used a novel SCDT involving two types of verbal materi-
als: 40 risk situations and 40 ambiguous situations. We performed
two normative studies for the elaboration of the verbal materi-
als, using different participants than in the main fMRI study. The
ﬁrst study was designed to select the most common risk situ-
ations in the adolescents’ and young adults’ personal experience.
Sixty-three risk scenarioswerewritten, basedon situations selected
from the Youth Risk Behavior Survey (2011). They belonged to
ﬁve domains: behaviors that contribute to unintentional injuries
(i.e., jumping to the sea from a high rock), risky sport practice
(i.e., climbing without appropriate equipment), unhealthy behav-
iors (i.e., competing to demonstrate who can eat more burgers),
unprotected sexual behaviors (i.e., having sex without condom),
and alcohol and other drug use (i.e., consuming cocaine). Sixty
participants (half adolescents and half young adults of both gen-
der) had to judge if they had been involved in a similar situation,
they had eye witnessed it or none of them. Then, they were given
examples of dangerous and safe options for each situation, and
asked to rate on a 1–5 point scale how dangerous these actions
would be for the protagonist.
Based on the results of the ratings, 40 risk situations (40% self-
experienced and 60% eye witnessed) distributed among the four
domains. The domain of sexual behaviors was excluded, as it pro-
duced the largest differences between responses given by women
and men. We selected those choices scoring at the extremes of
the scale (Mean = 4.03; SD = 0.48 for the dangerous option;
Mean = 1.57, SD = 0.37 for the safe option). Sixty ambigu-
ous situations were initially created, including each two neutral
options, and the participants were asked to choose between them.
Only those situations in which the two options were selected equal
number of times (about 50%) by the two age groups and genders
were included (40 ambiguous situations). The pairs of options
were also tested for how dangerous these actions would be for the
protagonist (Mean = 1.20, SD = 0.17) and eliminated those with
signiﬁcant age and gender differences. The length of the sentences
in the scenarios was matched in the number of words (risky sce-
nario: M = 20.27, SD = 3.09 and ambiguous scenario: M = 20.32,
SD = 3.03). Unfamiliar words were avoided in all the scenarios.
The second study was designed to match the emotional valence
of possible consequences for the two scenario conditions. For each
scenario, a positive and a negative consequence were written. One
hundred and twenty participants (half adolescents and half young
adults of both genders) were presented with a list of 128 negative
events (i.e., risk situations: “while smoking marijuana you feel
dizzy and have to go to the doctor”; ambiguous situations: “while
preparing a snack you cut your ﬁnger and bleed profusely”), and
128 positive events (i.e., risk situations: “you enjoy swimming
at the beach”; ambiguous situations: “you enjoy the meal at the
restaurant”). The participants rated them on a bipolar scale from
−5 (very negative) to+5 (very positive). Positive events were rated
as more positive in both conditions (risk situations: M = 3.98,
SD = 0.42; ambiguous situations: M = 4.05, SD = 0.42) than
negative events (risk situations: M =−4.66, SD= 0.39; ambiguous
situations: M = −4.45, SD = 0.42). More importantly, ratings
of negative events did not signiﬁcantly differ between risk and
ambiguous scenarios. Similarly, ratings of positive events did not
signiﬁcantly differ between risk and ambiguous scenarios.
Both the risk and the ambiguous experimental trials involved
the same sequence of events illustrated in Figure 1A: (1) A
second-person scenario describing “you” as accompanied by a
close friend; (2) The presentation of the two alternative options
for the decision-making task in that scenario; (3) After the partic-
ipants had made their choice, the presentation of the consequence
on the screen. This consequence was either positive or negative
following a pre-established table of contingencies that partici-
pants were unaware of; (4) Participants were then asked to indicate
“how do you feel about what just happened?” using a linear rating
scale at the bottom of the screen: from −5 (extremely bad) to +5
(extremely good). No information had to be learned or retrieved
over consecutive trials.
Figure 1B illustrates the timing of the events in a SCDT trial,
including the fMRI recording event. The presentation of eachpiece
of information was self-paced, allowing for the registering of the
reading times of the initial scenario, the decision time after the
onset of the options, the choices, the reading time of the con-
sequence, and the emotional rating. The ﬁrst 15 experimental
trials, including 10 risky and 5 ambiguous scenarios, were always
followed by positive consequences, to encourage participants to
choose dangerous options. The remaining 65 trials (30 risky and
35 ambiguous) were presented in pseudo-random order for each
participant. Participants were not informed about the change in
probability of the negative outcomes at any time during the exper-
iment. The outcomes pre-established by the experimenter for the
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Examples of SCDT (Social Context DecisionTask), in risk and ambiguous scenarios. (B)Temporal sequence of events in a trial.
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different conditions were as follows: in ambiguous scenarios 35%
of the consequences were negative and 65% were positive; by con-
trast, in risky situations the choice of the dangerous option was
followed by negative consequences 80% of the time and by pos-
itive consequences 20% of the time, whereas the choice of the
safe option, was always followed by positive outcomes. Notice that
in the ambiguous situations the amount of negative outcomes
that receive the participants corresponds to the nominal prob-
ability set up by the experimenter because the two choices (A
or B) are equivalent in terms of possible outcomes. This is not
the case for the risk situations, since each participant can choose
between the safe option (100%positive outcomes) and the danger-
ous option (80% negative outcomes), modifying accordingly the
total amount of negative consequences. The stimulus presentation
was controlled by means of a custom-developed script, devel-
oped in MatLab, using the Cogent 2000 v1.29 Software Toolbox
(http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php/ provided in the public
domain by the Laboratory of Neurobiology, University College
London, UK).
fMRI PROCEDURE
Before the scan, in a separate session, participants ﬁlled out the
screening tests. Then, those participants that passed the screening
came to the MRI laboratory and were prepared for the scanning
session with the SCDT. First, the participants received extensive
instructions and performed 10 practice trials in a mock scan-
ner that simulated the environment and sounds of an actual
MRI scanner. They were asked to imagine themselves (“imaging
you”) as vividly as possible in each situation accompanied with
a close friend and choose between the two alternative actions.
They were also told that there was no need to remember the per-
formance on previous trials, because the trials were not related,
and that all trials were equally important. Finally, we informed
them that “you will receive money as long as you follow our
instructions” but in fact the money received at the end of the
task (25€) was not contingent on the individual’s performance.
Immediately after the instructions and training, participants
were brought into the real scanner and the experimental session
started.
MRI DATA ACQUISITION
In total, 80 trials of the SCDT were presented (40 for each con-
dition). Each participant completed two 18-min functional runs,
with a 5-min resting period in between. Scanning was performed
at the laboratories of the Magnetic Resonance Service of the Uni-
versity of La Laguna. Images were obtained using a standard
whole-head coil on a 3.0 Tesla scanner Signa Excite HD model
manufactured by General Electric (Milwaukee, WI, USA). The
stimuli were presented visually via video-vision glasses compati-
blewithMRI (Visuastim,Resonance Technology, Inc.,Northridge,
CA, USA). Participants used two response controls (one for each
hand) compatible with Magnetic Resonance (Nordicneurolab).
Participants pressed the lower right button with their right thumb
to move from one screen to the next. To indicate their decision,
participants pressed one of the upper buttons of the response
devices with their right or left thumb to select the option that was
displayed to the right or left of the screen, respectively. Also, they
were instructed to use the same ﬁngers to move the cursor left and
right in the emotional rating task.
Functional data were acquired with a standard echo-planar
imagining sequence (TR = 2500 ms, TE = 22.2 ms, ﬂip angle = 90,
FOV = 24 × 24, matrix 64 × 64, 3-mm-thick 40 axial slices
acquired parallel to anterior–posterior commissural line, and voxel
size 3.75 × 3.75 × 3) and two runs (of total 600–700 scans), for
measurement of the BOLDeffect. Headmovementwasminimized
by padding. Before the functional scans, high-resolution T1-
weight anatomic images were recorded (TR = 4.768 ms, TI = 650
TE = 1, 9, ﬂip angle: 20, voxel size; 1.02 × 1.02 × 1, matrix
228 × 228, FOV 26 × 26, slice order: sequential, gap: 0).
fMRI PRE-PROCESSING AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Functional data processing and analyses were conducted using
Statistical Parametric Mapping software (SPM8, developed by
Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, UK, implemented
in Matlab 7.10, Match Works, Natick, MA). For each subject,
functional images were realigned to correct head motion, cor-
rected for slice acquisition time differences, co-registered with
anatomical image, smoothed in space with a three-dimensional,
8-mm FWHM (full width at half maximum) Gaussian Kernel,
and entered into a voxelwise analysis using the general linear
model (GLM). A high-pass ﬁlter with a cut-off at 128 s was
used to remove low frequency ﬂuctuations. An event-related
design was used and the BOLD time series data were modeled
using standard hemodynamic response function (HRF) with time
derivative.
The full experimental design involved two decision-making sit-
uations (risk/ambiguity) × 2 consequences (positive/negative).
Decision times were used as a covariate by trial and by person
because these times would inﬂuence the BOLD signal. Thus, as
participants would spend more time for selecting options in the
risk scenarios than in the ambiguous scenarios, the response time
for each individual was included as a covariate in the analyses as
a parametric modulator. This helps to control for differences in
the timing between both conditions that may have some impact
on the activations. The analysis focussed on the decision phase,
where the risk vs. ambiguous scenarios manipulation may have
more impact, by means of two contrasts: (a) the overall contrast
between risk and ambiguous conditions collapsingover the choices
and consequences, and (b) within the risk conditions, the contrast
between dangerous and safe choices, collapsing over the conse-
quences. We registered the BOLD signal from the onset of the two
alternative choices until the participants made their decisions (see
Figure 1B). We tested two whole-brain contrasts: Risk>Ambigu-
ity, and Ambiguity> Risk in the whole sample of 60 participants.
We also tested two whole-brain contrasts: Dangerous > Safe, and
Safe> Dangerous choices in the whole sample of 60 participants.
As participants would spend more time for selecting dangerous
options than safe options, the response time for each individual
was included as a covariate in the analyses. All contrast images
(beta maps) were calculated from individual-level GLM analysis,
normalized to the standardMontrealNeurological Institute (MNI)
brain template with a 3.75 × 3.75 × 3 voxel size, and then entered
into one sample t-test for the group level random- effect analyses.
Cluster larger than 10 voxels that reached a corrected familywise
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error rate (FWE) of p < 0.001 were considered signiﬁcant. FWE
correction was implemented by selecting this option in SPM8.
We analyzed time series, employing the ﬁnite impulse response
(FIR) algorithm to plot the temporal course of these activa-
tions in several ROIs. The ROIs were created by overlapping
the 10 mm spheres around the peak activations in the sig-
niﬁcant clusters obtained in the voxelwise analyses with the
corresponding MNI anatomical regions. The overlapping areas
were computed using the MarsBaR toolbox of the SPM8 (see
http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/ by Brett et al., 2002).
We also explored age and gender differences, performing
second-level whole-brain analyses for the interactions Age (ado-
lescents vs. young adults) × Type of decision-making situation
(risk vs. ambiguous), and Gender × Type of decision-making sit-
uation. We also explored age and gender differences, performing
whole-brain analyses that combined Age (adolescents vs. young
adults) × Type of Choice (dangerous vs. safe), and Gender × Type
of Choice (dangerous vs. safe). Given the reductionof data for each
experimental cell, and the expectable small effects of gender and
age (especially in our small range of ages), we relaxed the statistical
threshold in these contrasts: reported are effects with p < 0.001
(uncorrected) combined with an extent threshold of clustes larger
than 10 voxels.
Finally, a complementary set of correlational analyses was
performed to identify brain activations that reﬂect individual dif-
ferences in risk behavior. To this end, we ﬁrst obtained the percent
signal change for each participant, in the signiﬁcant clusters of
activation, and then we correlated these activation scores with
the individual percentage of risky choices in the SCDT. A simi-
lar procedure was followed with the differential peak activations
between Dangerous and Safe choices in the signiﬁcant clusters
obtained.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Reading times for the risk scenarios were signiﬁcantly longer
than those for ambiguous scenarios [M = 4883 ms, SD = 839;
M = 4755 ms, SD = 921, respectively; F(1,56) = 26.7;
p < 0.001]. There was a signiﬁcant interaction of scenarios by
gender [F(1,56) = 6.42; p < 0.014], due to the fact that women
spent less time in reading the ambiguous contexts than men
(M = 4520 ms, SD = 800; M = 4989 ms, SD = 985, respec-
tively), but no signiﬁcant gender difference was found for the
reading times of the risk scenarios. Participants spent more time
for selecting options in the risk scenarios than in the ambiguous
scenarios [M = 3814 ms, SD = 730; M = 3423 ms, SD = 668,
respectively; F(1,56) = 38.6; p < 0.001]; no signiﬁcant effects of
age or gender were found. Within the risk condition, participants
spent signiﬁcantly more time for selecting the dangerous options
than the safe options (M = 4054 ms, SD = 859; M = 3333 ms,
SD = 671, respectively; F(1,56) = 62.29; p< 0.001); no signiﬁcant
effects of age or gender were found. Finally, participants chose the
dangerous option in 34.7% of the risk situation trials (range from
19.2 to 50.2), with no age or gender differences, and they randomly
chose the A and B options in the ambiguous situation trials (range
from 48.4 to 51%; t = 0.546, p > 0.05), with no signiﬁcant age or
gender differences.
BRAIN REGIONS INVOLVED IN RISK vs. AMBIGUOUS CONDITIONS
Figure 2 shows the signiﬁcant clusters of activation from the con-
trast Risk > Ambiguity in the total sample of participants. The
complete list of signiﬁcant clusters corrected by this covariate is
shown in Table 1. There was a broad network of frontal and pre-
frontal structures activated, including right DLPFC extending to
the precentral gyrus, left DLPFC, right ACC, bilateral OFC, right
inferior, medial and superior frontal gyrus. In addition, there
were activations in temporal and parietal structures, including
the TPJ bilaterally, bilateral middle temporal gyrus (MTG), bilat-
eral precuneus and the inferior parietal lobe. Other areas with
signiﬁcant clusters of activation were the right insula and the
right precentral gyrus. The ROIs employed in the FIR analyses
were: right ACC, right inferior OFC, left DLPFC, right DLPFC,
right insula, and right precuneus. ROIs were constructed for each
cluster of activation using a sphere of 10 mm around the MNI
coordinates for the peak of activation. With a similar procedure
we also created ROIs for the right TPJ and left TPJ, except that
the MNI coordinates were taken from Saxe et al. (2009) study
on ToM.
The reverse comparison (Ambiguity > Risk) did not show
any signiﬁcant activation at the statistical threshold deﬁned. The
correlations between the activation scores in risk vs. ambiguous
conditions for each participant and the percentage of the risk
options in the SCDT did not reach signiﬁcant values for any of
the clusters in Table 1.
BRAIN REGIONS INVOLVED IN DANGEROUS vs. SAFE OPTIONS IN RISK
SITUATIONS
Figure 3A shows the main signiﬁcant clusters of activation cor-
responding to the contrast Dangerous > Safe choices in the total
sample of participants. The complete list of signiﬁcant clusters is
shown in Table 2. There were two clusters of activation involving
the left ACC, one cluster involving the right ACC and one cluster
involving the left superior temporal pole (TP). The resulting ROIs
employed in the FIR analyses corresponded to the same activa-
tions following the same procedure than in the previous contrast.
The reverse comparison (Safe>Dangerous) did not show any sig-
niﬁcant activation at the statistical threshold deﬁned. Finally, the
correlations between the activation scores in dangerous vs. safe
choices for each participant and the percentage of the risk choices
in the SCDT did not reach signiﬁcant values for any of the clusters
in Table 2.
AGE- AND GENDER-RELATED MODULATIONS OF NEURAL PROCESSES
IN THE SCDT
Concerning the contrast between Risk vs. Ambiguous conditions,
as Table 1 shows, the direct contrast between the two age groups
produced signiﬁcant differences in the adolescents> young adults
contrast for the right middle frontal gyrus (DLPFC) and the right
TPJ (See Figure 4A). Table 1 also shows the direct statistical con-
trasts testing the gender effect, which yield signiﬁcant effects in the
female > male comparison in the right insula and right superior
temporal gyrus (see Figure 4B).
Concerning the contrast between Dangerous vs. Safe choices,
as Table 2 shows, the direct contrast between the two age groups
produced signiﬁcant differences in the young adults> adolescents
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FIGURE 2 |The clusters of activation in the whole-brain analyses for the contrast Risk >Ambiguity (corrected FWE, p = 001 and K > 10; N = 60) are
circled for several regions. Changes in the BOLD signal (percent) across time for the same regions for the risk (blue) and the ambiguity (red) conditions are
also shown, using time intervals of 2.5 s.
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Table 1 | Significant clusters of activation in the whole-brain analysis for the contrast Risk >Ambiguity for all participants (N = 60) and by age
and gender groups (FWE, corrected, p ≤ 0.001; except contrasts marked with symbol * that employed an uncorrected threshold of p ≤ 0.001;
extent threshold > 10 voxels).
Region BA Cluster size Z -score x, y, z
Right temporoparietal junction 37 175 7.66 53, −60, 22
Left temporoparietal junction 21 199 7.66 −56, −56, 22
Left inferior parietal lobe 40 22 6.40 −56, −51, 44
Right middle temporal gyrus 21 121 7.47 53, 1, −23
Left middle temporal gyrus 21 57 7.06 −56, −45, 1
Right inferior frontal gyrus, triangularis 45 16 5.83 53, 23, 16
Right inferior frontal gyrus, orbital 38 63 6.67 42, 23, −14
Left inferior frontal gyrus, orbital 38 14 6.10 −49, 19, −6,
Right middle frontal gyrus 44 28 5.89 46, 23, 37
Left middle frontal gyrus 44 16 5.90 −37, 23, 37
Right precentral gyrus 6 67 6.67 46, 8, 46
Right superior frontal gyrus 8 15 6.04 23, 23, 46
Right insula 48 13 6.67 36, 16, −9
Right precuneus 23 212 6.97 12, −52, 34
Left precuneus 23 63 6.75 −4, −52, 35
Right dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 9 57 6.79 5, 38, 43
Right anterior cingulate cortex 32 12 6.79 7, 44, 23
Adolescents > young adults *
Right middle frontal gyrus 9 14 4.07 38, 31, 43
Right temporoparietal junction 21 10 3.67 53, −56, 19
Female >male participants *
Right insula 48 10 3.63 38, −18, 14
Right superior temporal gyrus 42 13 3.62 57, −33, 16
The voxel size was 3.75 mm × 3.75 mm × 3 mm.
contrast for the right and left MTG and the right pre-
supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) in Figure 3B. No gender
effects were found.
DISCUSSION
This study explored the effects of type of decision in social
decision-making in late adolescence and young adults. We devel-
oped a novel SCDT involving simulated situations of risk and
ambiguous decision-making in which the protagonist (“you”) is
accompanied by a close peer. Behaviorally, the comprehension
of the scenarios and the decision-making process requires more
elaboration and more cognitive cost under the risk situation than
under the ambiguous situation, as suggested by the increasing
reading times of the scenarios and the larger decision times. Like-
wise, in risk situations participants spent more time in making a
dangerous choice than a safe choice. Participants selected the dan-
gerous choice around 35% of the trials during scanning, a ﬁgure
that matches well the results of the normative study in which 40%
of the risk situations were self-experienced. No differences were
found between the age groups, similarly to what was found in a
gambling task in another study with a broader span of age groups
(e.g., Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010). Women and men chose the
risky options equally often, due to the avoidance of gender-biased
contents in the SCDT, and consistent with other laboratory studies
on decision-making (Gardner and Steinberg, 2005; Galvan et al.,
2007; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010).
Regarding the neuroimaging results for the whole sample of
participants, two main ﬁndings are remarkable. First, as expected,
the SCDT in risk scenarios (compared to ambiguous scenarios)
activated part of the control-related circuitry usually reported in
the decision-making literature employing gambling tasks, namely
the right ACC, the bilateral DLPFC, the bilateral OFC as well
as the right insula, associated with the emotional processes in
risk scenarios. Notice that the OFC activation in risk situations
cannot be due to the higher likelihood of negative consequences
for the dangerous choices (80%), since participants on the aver-
age chose the dangerous option only in 34.7% of the trials, and
received thus negative consequences in 27.8% of the total num-
ber of trials, in comparison with 35% of negative outcomes in the
ambiguous situations. Second, as expected, and unlike the gam-
bling tasks in non-social contexts, the SCDT in social scenarios
also activated brain areas typically related to social cognition pro-
cesses: the bilateral TPJ, the bilateral MTG, the right dorsomedial
PFC and the bilateral precuneus. These activations are compatible
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FIGURE 3 | (A)The clusters of activation in the whole-brain analyses for the
contrast Dangerous > Safe choice (uncorrected threshold, p = 0.0001 and
K > 10; N = 60) are circled for several regions. Changes in the BOLD signal
(percent) across time for the same regions for the dangerous (blue) and safe
(green) options are also shown, using time intervals of 2.5 s. (B) Differential
activations inYoung adults (N = 30) compared to Adolescents (N = 30) in the
contrast Dangerous > Safe choice (uncorrected threshold, p = 0.0001 and
K > 10), produced two bilateral clusters in the middle temporal gyrus and the
right pre-supplementary area. The changes in the BOLD signal across time for
these regions in each age group are shown, using time intervals of 2.5 s.
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Table 2 | Significant clusters of activation in the whole-brain analysis for the contrast Dangerous choice > Safechoice (N = 60) and by age
groups (FWE, corrected, p ≤ 0.0001; except contrasts marked with symbol “*” that employed an uncorrected threshold of p ≤ 0.0001; extent
threshold > 10 voxels).
Region BA Cluster size Z -score x, y, z
All participants
Left anterior cingulate cortex 32 30 4.77 1, 42, 25
Left anterior cingulate cortex 11 32 4.46 −11, 38, −2
Right anterior cingulate cortex 32 12 3.84 13, 39, 7
Left superior temporal pole 38 19 4.56 −51, 14, −8
Young adults > adolescents*
Right middle temporal gyrus 21 15 3.87 61, −41, −5
Left middle temporal gyrus 21 13 3.45 −52, −41, −2
Right pre-supplementary motor area 6 12 3.40 5, 1, 64
The voxel size was 3.75 mm × 3.75 mm × 3 mm.
with our prediction of engagement of the self-reﬂection network
(van der Meer et al., 2010) and the ToM network (e.g., Frith
and Frith, 2003; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003). In fact, both sys-
tems greatly overlap, as the self-reﬂection system (speciﬁcally the
dorsomedial PFC) is also responsible for evaluation and decision-
making processes in self- and other-referential processing (van
der Meer et al., 2010). The activation of the precuneus is also
reported in both systems since this region is involved in a wide
spectrumof highly self-processing operations, namely ﬁrst-person
perspective-taking in the experience of agency or sense of con-
trol over actions (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006) and in situation
model updating during narrative comprehension (Ferstl et al.,
2008). Unexpectedly, we also found activations in the right and
left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), a region primarily associated with
language production (left IFG), but also with the perception of
biological actions and mental inference, although its role as a
potential component of the ToM network is still under discussion
(Mar, 2011).
As predicted, the extensive involvement of the cognitive
control-related brain regions in the SCDTs was speciﬁc to risk
decision-making, appearing in the contrast Risk > Ambiguity. In
contrast, the inverse comparison Ambiguity > Risk did not show
any area signiﬁcantly activated. This ﬁnding clearly departs from
the more balanced pattern of control-related activations gener-
ally obtained for risk and ambiguity conditions in gambling tasks
in non-social contexts (e.g., Krain et al., 2006). However, in line
with our results, some studies also reported more involvement of
control-related regions in risk-taking or conﬂict resolution behav-
ior than in more neutral situations. Thus, the right DLPFC has
been found to be critical for the regulation of risk-taking behav-
ior in gambling tasks, as suggested by a study that disrupted the
DLPFC function in adults by means of repetitive TMS, resulting
in an increase of dangerous choices (Knoch et al., 2006). More-
over, more ACC activation has been obtained in attention and
action monitoring tasks, especially in the context of response con-
ﬂict, which is a similar case to our risk decision-making scenarios
(Barch et al., 2000; van Veen and Carter, 2002; Wang et al., 2005;
Brown and Braver, 2008; Modirrousta and Fellows, 2008). Beyond
the control-related activations, we also obtained activation in the
right insula in risk conditions, consistent with its role in signaling
aversive consequences, which occur more frequently under risk
conditions (Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004; Paulus and Stein, 2006;
Clark et al., 2008).
As predicted, the SCDT activated the brain areas presumably
implicated in the social cognitive processing (self-reﬂection and
ToM networks) in the risk situations only, not in the ambigu-
ous situations. Before reaching a conclusion it is important to
acknowledge that these brain regions partly overlap with the net-
work involved in story comprehension (Ferstl et al., 2008; Mar,
2011). Therefore, it would be the case that the pattern of ﬁndings
in the SCDT would reﬂect the higher verbal demands required in
the processing of the risk situations than in ambiguous situations.
However, verbal materials in risk and ambiguous situations were
controlled for their lexical and syntactical complexity, which sug-
gests that other non-linguistic factors are involved in the activation
of this neural pattern. In particular, we propose that socio-
cognitive factorswould be involved in the decision-making process
in social contexts. Our results clearly show that merely mention-
ing a character is not sufﬁcient to trigger the activation of those
regions, since participants made choices in social scenarios accom-
panied by peers both in risk and ambiguous conditions. Notice
that just being an external observer of a participant’s action is
not either enough to activate them (Chein et al., 2011). Therefore,
recruitment of brain regions related to social cognition processes
may require thinking about a person’s beliefs that is relevant to
the self-decision-making, not just acknowledging a person’s pres-
ence (Saxe et al., 2004; Uddin et al., 2007). This condition could
be achieved by stressing the relevance of the peers in the decision-
making after the induction of a social exclusion episode (Peake
et al., 2013).
In our study, the activation of brain areas related to social cog-
nition processes seems especially important in those risk situations
requiring participants to choose between a dangerous and a safe
option. We have advanced an explanation related to the nature
of the type of social decision-making involved. Social decision-
making in risk situations entails for the participants two sets of
clear expectancies regarding: (a) the consequences for themselves
of their risky or safe choices and (b) the impact of their choices to
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FIGURE 4 | (A) Differential activations in Adolescents (N = 30) compared to
Young adults (N = 30) in the contrast Risk > Ambiguity, produced two
signiﬁcant clusters in the right DLPFC and the right TPJ. The changes in the
BOLD signal across time for these regions are also shown in each age group.
(B) Differential activations in Females (N = 30) compared to Males (N = 30),
in the contrast Risk > Ambiguity, produced two clusters in the right insula
and the superior temporal gyrus. Also the changes in the BOLD signal across
time are shown for these regions in each gender group, using time intervals
of 2.5 s. Age and gender results were signiﬁcant at an uncorrected threshold
of p = 0.001, and K > 10.
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the peers’ beliefs and attitudes towards themselves. For instance,
participants expect that risky choices may have negative conse-
quences for their health but also expect to obtain positive reactions
from their peers, and the reverse for the safe choices. By contrast,
social decision-making in ambiguous situations did not entail such
clear expectancies since the consequences of the neutral choices
come by accident without any control over the situation and there
are no clear expectances related to the impact of neutral choices
to the peers’ point of view. Therefore, the recruitment of brain
regions related to social cognition processes takes place in risk sit-
uations only, where thinking about a person’s beliefs is relevant to
the self-decision-making.
An extensive involvement of the bilateral ACC region was
obtained in the speciﬁc contrast Dangerous > Safe choices in the
risk situations of the SCDT, consistent with previous studies on
adolescent decision-making that emphasize the role of ACC in
conﬂict processing as part of the control system (e.g., Steinberg,
2010; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010; Chein et al., 2011). In con-
trast, the lack of involvement of the brain’s reward system (e.g.,
VS) in the SCDT is remarkable. This ﬁnding was possibly due to
the lack of feedback and/or monetary reward contingent on the
participants’ performance. Some researchers also observe either
hypoactivity or no differences between adolescents and adults in
VS responses to some reward conditions or paradigms (Pfeifer
and Allen, 2012). More studies are needed to further investi-
gate the role of the reward system in social decision-making. A
cluster of activation in the left superior TP was found in the
SCDT when choosing the dangerous choice as compared to the
safe choice. Primarily conceived as playing a key role in semantic
memory, recent reviews show that the TP has also been impli-
cated in social cognition processes including emotion processing,
moral cognition, person-speciﬁc knowledge, knowledge about
social behavior, stereotypes, and ToM (Ferstl and von Cramon,
2007; Olson et al., 2007; Ross and Olson, 2010; Wong and Gallate,
2012). This would suggest that emotional and social processing is
also implied in choosing the dangerous option (Blakemore and
Robbins, 2012; Crone and Dahl, 2012). An alternate explana-
tion is that the left TP has been more actively engaged in tasks
that include a strong verbal component, which is likely to be
the case of the SCDT (Mar, 2011). However, this explanation
should be ruled out since in our normative studies both ver-
bal choices in risk situations were controlled for semantic and
syntactic complexity.
In spite of the small range of ages employed in this study, the
adolescents exhibited more activation in two regions in the con-
trast risk > ambiguous situations. First, adolescents activated the
right DLPFC signiﬁcantly more than young adults. This ﬁnding
is in line with previous studies using wider ranges of age groups,
which also reported more activation in DLPFC areas in children
and adolescents than in adults in gambling tasks (Galvan et al.,
2006; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010). According to Steinberg (2008,
2010) considerable evidence suggests that higher level cognition,
including the uniquely human capacities for abstract reasoning
and deliberative action, is supported by a recently evolved brain
system, including highly interconnected regions in the lateral pre-
frontal and parietal association cortex and parts of the ACC.
Second, adolescents exhibited greater activation than young adults
in the right TPJ, a region considered crucial for ToM.Developmen-
tal fMRI studies of mental state attribution also showed decreases
in ToM regions (e.g., mPFC and right TPJ) between adolescence
and adulthood (Blakemore, 2008; Young et al., 2010; Burnett et al.,
2011; Sebastian et al., 2011).
When examining developmental effects in the speciﬁc con-
trast dangerous > safe choices in the SCDT, we found that young
adults exhibited higher bilateral activations over the MTG and
over the right pre-SMA than adolescents. The ﬁrst result suggests
the further engagement of part of the ToM circuitry when choos-
ing the dangerous option as compared to the safe option at later
ages. In addition, it was also found that young adults activate
the pre-SMA more than adolescents during dangerous choices in
the SCDT. The functional role of the pre-SMA has been recently
associated with the need to exert complex cognitive control in
conﬂict processing (Nachev et al., 2008; Usami et al., 2013), such
as the ones required in free-choice tasks like in SCDT. This cog-
nitive control is suggested to require complex motor skills such
as alternation of motor plans, task switching, acquisition of new
motor skills, and motor selection. In sum, the process of choos-
ing a dangerous option in young adults seems to involve a further
consideration of the social aspects of the risk situation as well
as the planning of the action involved in the choice for control
purposes.
Concerning the gender differences, only young women exhib-
ited differential activations (female>male) in the risk> ambigu-
ous contrast in SCDT. Speciﬁcally, young women elicited more
activation in the right insula and the superior temporal gyrus than
young men under risky decision-making conditions, suggesting
that they probably get more emotionally engaged in the anticipa-
tion of aversive outcomes resulting from dangerous options (Clark
et al., 2008). Increased insula activity in women is also consistent
with the hypothesis that they could be more empathic with the
character’s risky decision-making than men, as the role of this
region in empathic processing has been well established (Singer
et al., 2004, 2006; Botvinick et al., 2005; Jackson et al., 2006; Lamm
et al., 2007; Saarela et al., 2007). Right and left TPJ were similarly
activated for both genders in our study, however only women acti-
vated one region of the ToM network more than men, namely the
right superior temporal gyrus, suggesting their further engage-
ment in the modeling of peers’ state of mind. No further gender
differences were found when considering the speciﬁc contrast
dangerous> safe options.
A limitation should be mentioned at this point. Activations in
the control and the social cognition networks were not related to
individual differences in the risk-taking in the SCDT. This was
probably due to the reduced individual variability in the decision-
making task, resulting from the proximity of the two age groups
and the selection of typical risky scenarios according to the nor-
mative studies. In fact, performance in the SCDT was not sensitive
to either age- or gender-related differences. This lack of sensitivity
limits the ability of the study to explain individual differences
in actual risk-taking behavior in social contexts. It also limits
sound conclusions regarding the speciﬁc role of self-reﬂection
and ToM processes in risk-taking behavior. Future applications
of the SCDT to a high-risk group of adolescents and young adults
would increase the individual variability, therebyproviding further
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insights into the role of the social cognition processes in social
decision-making.
In conclusion, neuroimaging results with the SCDT have
demonstrated a differential pattern of activations in neural net-
works related to cognitive control and social cognition processes
in the risk situations compared to the ambiguous situations, even
though in both cases a decision is made in a naturalistic sce-
nario including the presence of peers. While the activation of
control-related regions was also shown in previous studies of
decision-making using a variety of tasks, it appears that the acti-
vation of brain regions implied in emotional and social cognition
processes is speciﬁc to social decision-making tasks in which the
presence of peers in the scenario is relevant for the type of deci-
sions being made. Choosing the dangerous option involved a
further activation of control areas (ACC) and an emotional and
social cognition area (TP), which was not previously reported in
decision-making studies. The cognitive control and ToM systems
were dependent on the participants’ age in the right DLPFC and
right TPJ regions, respectively, towards a more mature function-
ing. Further engagement in ToM regions (bilateral MTG) and
in motor control regions (pre-SMA) related to the planning of
actions were found in young adults when choosing the dangerous
option. Finally, female participants more than males differentially
activated the right insula and right superior temporal gyrus sug-
gesting that they get more emotionally engaged and performed
an additional modeling of the peer’s state of mind in the risky
decision-making conditions.
Our ﬁndingswith the SCDT contribute in threeways to the cur-
rent dual model of adolescent risk-taking based on the existence
of a developmental imbalance between the cognitive control and
reward brain circuitry (Steinberg, 2008, 2010; Ernst et al., 2009;
Somerville et al., 2010; Casey et al., 2011). First, the present acti-
vation patterns suggest the engagement of emotional and social
cognition processes in risk decision-making, in addition to the
cognitive control processes traditionally reported. Second, our
developmental ﬁndings indicate that control processes in risk
decision-making are not the only ones that undergo late devel-
opments but also the emotional and social cognition processes
(Blakemore and Robbins, 2012; Crone and Dahl, 2012). Finally,
our results highlight the need of improving the functional attribu-
tion of developmental results (Pfeifer and Allen, 2012). In the
same study, we have obtained developmental changes indicat-
ing that teens activate the right regions of DLPFC and TPJ more
than young adults as well as changes indicating that young adults
activate the MTG and the pre-SMA more than adolescents. The
notion of neural efﬁciency, as it reﬂects the need to engage more
brain activity in these areas in the less mature brain, is compat-
ible with the ﬁrst results but not with the second ones. In sum,
the present ﬁndings substantiate the call for more comprehensive
developmental accounts that incorporate the role of emotional and
social cognition processes in risk decision-making in social con-
texts and reﬁne the interpretation of the developmental changes
observed.
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